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A RESPONSE TO "THE
RHETORIC OF POWELL'S BAKKE"
JAMES B. WHITE*
In his article Professor LaRue draws a direct connection between
"who we are," which is the central question of ethics, and "how we talk,"
which is the central question of rhetoric. He asks those questions of legal
literature, in this instance of a single judicial opinion, in order to
discover how this part of our rhetorical and ethical community is con-
stituted. He thus unites the concerns of ethics, rhetoric, and law in pur-
suit of a central question-the definition of character and community.
There are two different ways in which character is defined in a
judicial opinion. First, there is the question how the writer defines
himself, and the institution of which he is a part; second, how he defines
the members of the social world he intends to address and to regulate.
To take one obvious line, for example, it would be possible to ask of a
particular opinion how far it demonstrates the assumptions about the
character of its author-his competence, his knowledge, his statesman-
ship-upon which the opinion's authority may be said to rest. It is
perfectly fair to ask of any opinion: what evidence is there here that this
person should have the job of deciding a case such as this and others like
it? If, for example, the reason the Court is thought to have the power to
decide a certain kind of question is the learning that is required to
decide it well, what evidence is there here of such learning? On the other
hand, if all the Court does is to identify and balance interests, and to ex-
press a preference for one over another, as any law student, practically
any citizen, could do, why should we have judges do that? As my tone
may suggest, I think that there has been in recent years a real, but as
yet unanalyzed, degradation in the language in which the Supreme
Court speaks, and that this has entailed an erosion of the moral and
political-Professor LaRue might call it the rhetorical and ethical-basis
of its authority. This phenomenon, if such it be, has not been described
and explained, and the Bakke opinion-in which the voice of the
Supreme Court at the most critical moment of decision collapses into the
voice of a Harvard College brochure -would not be a bad place to start.
Professor LaRue, however, focuses not upon this kind of question
but upon those of the second sort: asking how the Bakke opinion talks
about its audience-the people whose lives the decision affects- and
what sort of community the decision establishes. In Bakke, the white and
minority applicants for medical school, who are in some sense competing
for the same positions, are told what is at stake in that competition.
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Each is afforded a language in which to characterize himself and the
other, in which to explain his success or failure, to himself and to his
friends. How adequate is this language to such purposes? (This is part of
what Professor LaRue means, I think, when he asks how "persuasive"
the opinion is). The discourse used by Justice Powell, according to Pro-
fessor LaRue, is defective at its heart, because it is divorced from what
he calls "history," which means that it is both unreal to the participants,
and itself ultimately incoherent. (The guidance this language gives to
those who make decisions of admission is unintelligible, unless it be to
administer a quota system and to pretend not to).
But, one may ask of Professor LaRue, what would talk about these
matters that was not divorced from history look like? As I read his arti-
cle, Professor LaRue would favor a jurisprudence of the equal protection
clause that was closely tied to its original purposes of eliminating the ef-
fects of black slavery, and which would certainly not subject to "strict
scrutiny" a State's attempt to achieve that result. Presumably a State
would have similar if less drastic powers to remedy the effects of other
forms of racial discrimination, but the case of the blacks would remain
the paradigm to which others need be assimilated.
All of this is appealing to one who thinks in terms of specific con-
texts and cases, and not theories. And Professor LaRue's approach en-
tails two interesting results as well. First, such a jurisprudence could
make a sort of sense, have a kind of coherence, that the modern version
of the equal protection clause -potentially authorizing the review of
every legislative classification in the world-cannot possibly have. And
the coherence derives not from a theoretical principle, but from an
understanding of the evil the clause was intended to remedy. The
related second point is this: while the method of this approach is to root
oneself in facts, its result is a clarification of value.
In specific terms, the reasoning of Professor LaRue would permit a
State to set aside a specified number of places in its schools of higher
education for blacks, and perhaps for members of other minority races
as well. These places would be reserved not because minorities had so
much to contribute to the educational process, but as a way of attempt-
ing to reduce harms, inflicted upon them or their families by the white
race from which they are still suffering. This is what it means to talk to
the black applicant for medical school in terms of his history.
But what of the white applicant? Here is a suggested addition to Pro-
fessor LaRue's paper. One possibility would be to say to him that he is to
pay, with his place in school, for the crimes committed by members of his
race upon the blacks they enslaved and brutalized. Conceived of as an
"isolated" individual in competition with others, he is to suffer a com-
petitive harm in order to make another whole for an earlier injury. To
this the applicant might well respond that he never owned or trans-
ported slaves, and neither did his ancestors-who perhaps, like Bakke's,
came to America after slavery was abolished-and he has never profited
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personally from the wrongs done to blacks. In his own life he has never
discriminated, but he has been discriminated against, on the ground of
race. What can one say in response?
To answer him I think we must change our statement of what we are
doing, and why. The idea is not that he must pay today for what someone
of his race did a hundred years ago, or more, that he must give up
something to his black competitor because of prior crimes. There is,
after all, another possibility. Think for a moment of the relationship be-
tween the ideal Union soldier and the slave he fought to free: he was not
paying a debt for his past transgressions, but risking, perhaps losing, his
life and wealth, in order to live in a national community in which no
people would be slaves, and in which the effects of slavery would be
destroyed. He was not the competitor but the friend of the slave. What
we say to the modern white applicant is that he too is a member of a
community that is seeking to rid itself of the residual and terrible evils
of slavery, and that he should look upon what it costs him as a burden of
that improvement, a burden like the soldier's burden which is in some
sense a privilege to bear, even when imposed upon a draftee, then or
now. This argument rests upon his imagined identity not with the white
slave owner, but with the white liberator, and asks that he share and act
upon those values. This is to insist upon a community of value between
ourselves and those who won that war and established the Constitution
of the country on a new basis. Such a community is what an inherited
constitution is, a cultural legacy-not a penalty paid for the crimes of
one's ancestors, but an opportunity for meaningful action. It is not too
much to insist upon.
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